IRAN: A CONFLICT WITHOUT JUSTIFICATION OR STRATEGY

 

My views on war and its place in American foreign policy have changed dramatically over the years. As a child, my family were members of a tiny Quaker congregation (Religious Society of Friends) that met in the Meeting House that defined our small N.J. hamlet, Quakertown.

In the Quaker tradition, several male members of our gathering were pacifists and had gone to prison rather than take up arms in WWII. Pacifists believe that using violence is never legitimate, even in self-defense.   

At Swarthmore College, my thinking on war evolved. The college was founded by Quakers and now houses the Peace Collection. It is the most extensive “non-violence” research library and archive collection in the world, focused solely on movements for peace.

In 1970 the Nixon administration’s Cambodian Campaign fueled a major domestic antiwar movement in the U.S. The Swarthmore campus shut down for a week to permit students time to conduct anti-draft work in Philadelphia and to attend the protest marches in Washington, D.C.

I remained vehemently opposed to the Vietnam War and still feel strongly about peace in international relations. However, I dropped my support for pacifism. In my philosophy studies I came to believe that individuals have a moral right to protect themselves and their families from imminent threats.

 After graduation, my views further developed into not opposing “just wars,” to stop aggression or genocide. Today, I am a realist and believe it is a primary responsibility of the U.S. to provide national security, within the framework of international law.

My hope for international peace has led me to study and understand war. When a major conflict occurs, there are two published books that provide perspective on whether a hostile engagement is justified and/or is being conducted in a rational manner. The first, War: How Conflict Shapes Us, by Margaret Olwen MacMillan, a Canadian historian and emeritus professor at the University of Oxford is an historical study of war as a central force in human history.

MacMillan starts from the premise that “War is an uncomfortable and challenging subject not least because it brings out both the vilest and the noblest aspects of humanity.” By the end of the book and its many examples, the reader has a better understanding of the circumstances under which war was “dreadful and unnecessary” and when it was “required.”

My second reference on conflict is Strategy, A History. It was written by one of the world’s most eminent authorities on war and international politics, British historian Sir Lawerence Freedman. The author tackles the subject of how best to conduct military campaigns after conflict begins.

Freedman reminds us, “A strategic approach is preferable to one that is merely tactical, let alone random. Having a strategy suggests the ability to look up from the short term to view the long term and the essential to address causes rather than symptoms. Without a strategy, facing up to any problem or striving for any objective would be considered negligent.”

Freedman has written extensively on the “fog of war,” a term coined by the Prussian military strategist, Carl von Clausewitz.  It refers to the uncertainty regarding enemy intentions on the battlefield. It forces military strategies to evolve from rigid planning into adaptive, intelligence-driven decision-making. Freedman warns that the promise of technological superiority can create a "misleading perception of risk-free war,” which can lead to unexpected consequences. He must have had the Iran conflict in mind.

After considering the themes of these two books, it is my view that the unprovoked Iran attack, initiated by the Trump administration, initially failed the justification test. It now is badly failing the strategy test due to the administration’s tactical, and often random approach.

There is little confidence when the Trump administration’s justification for starting the war changes as often as the March weather. Many foreign policy experts have concluded Trump is simply “making it up as he goes along.” This is not surprising given the President’s “personalization” of domestic politics and of the global order. In Ukraine, Venezuela, and now in Iran, his individual whims are driving great-power policy. There is no advisor willing to challenge him.

In this 250^th year since our nation’s founding, each of us should reflect on the fact that a personalist, one-man government is contrary to everything our democratic constitutional republic stands for.

Journalist and commentator Thomas Friedman makes an excellent analogy when discussing Trump’s Iran justification and strategy. “Would you invest in a company whose leader, without warning, embarked on a radically new business strategy and then, by the next week, described its goals in five different ways? That is a flashing red light.”

The endgame that now appears to have gained the most traction is to remove the Islamic regime from Tehran. This result should improve prospects for Iran and for Middle East peace. However, there seems to be little thought on how to reach this goal or an explanation of the blood and treasure that must be spent to attain it.

Lastly, no rational, flexible military strategy has been articulated. Each morning the Secretary of War, Pete Hegseth, stands before the press corps and emphasizes “the destruction of enemy capabilities,” “fighting to win” and “acting on the President’s timeline.”

Hegseth’s boastful words offer little assurance that this unprovoked “small excursion” will not become a larger war. A war offering few strategic advantages to America.